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Article 5

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 3

Comments
SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND THE LABOR CONTRACTTWO NEBRASKA PUZZLES
The purpose of this article is to analyze certain characterizations of "substantive law" by the United States Supreme Court in
the labor contract field; to determine what impact these designations may have on Nebraska law; and finally, to solve the two jigsaw
puzzles created by the interplay of these decisions with both Nebraska and other federal law. The Supreme Court has held that
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act1 creates a
body of federal substantive contract law. 2 The question involved
with respect to Nebraska law is whether this creation of federal
contract law has any effect upon the Nebraska rule against enforcement of arbitration agreements. 3 To be considered also are the
problems raised by an attempt to enforce, through injunction, a
no-strike clause contained in a labor contract. It is from these
framework pieces that the first puzzle must be constructed.
The second puzzle with which this article will deal is the combined result of the Nebraska "right-to-work" law, 4 a recent Supreme
Court holding that state courts may enforce their prohibitions
against an agency shop union security agreement, 5 and a statement
by the Court that state substantive law determines whether a
particular union security device is prohibited. 6 The questions here
raised concern the possible situations in which Nebraska law can
determine the validity of a clause in a collective bargaining contract
which otherwise would be valid under federal law, and, further,
the point at which this state power commences.
The dominant theme is thus one of pre-emption in situations
where Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act or Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act 7 are operative.8

161 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
2
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3 Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934). See
discussion at subsection A of Part I, infra.
4 NE . REV. STAT. § 48-217 (Supp. 1961).
5 Retail Clerks International v. Schermerhorn, 84 Sup. Ct. 219 (1963).
6
Retail Clerks International v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
761 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
8 A third major area of pre-emption in the labor relations area is the
so-called Garmon doctrine. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
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These problems have been raised by Supreme Court characterization of "substantive law," and are particularly important to the
Nebraska attorney because the Nebraska internal law in these and
related areas is significantly affected.
PART I
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

-LINCOLN

MILLS AND

RENTSCHLER

A. THE NEBRASKA RULE ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The Nebraska Supreme Court has firmly committed itself to
the doctrine that an executory agreement to arbitrate a dispute
will not be enforced, 9 nor will it constitute a valid defense to an
action based upon the disputed matter which the parties agreed to
arbitrate.'0 There has been, however, only one Nebraska decision
in which the arbitration agreement sought to be enforced formed
a part of an employer-employee working agreement. In Rentschler
v. Missouri Pac. R.R." an employee brought an action against the
mon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) the Supreme Court held that when an activity
is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act the
jurisdiction of both the state and federal courts must defer to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. See e.g.,
Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962). But see Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 175 (1962), discussed at note 38 infra, and
Retail Clerks, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 84 Sup. Ct. 219 (1963), discussed in Part II D infra, for the labor contract areas in which exceptions to the Garmon doctrine have been engrafted.
9 Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657
(1950); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902);
Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085 (1901); National Masonic
Acc. Ass'n v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N.W. 466 (1895); Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bean, 42 Neb. 537, 60 N.W. 907 (1894); Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick,
36 Neb. 223, 54 N.W. 519 (1893); German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889).
10 Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 174, 43 N.W.2d
657, 665 (1950) ("Whatever distinction may be made elsewhere between arbitration generally and arbitration as to damages only, it is
well settled in this state that a provision in a contract requiring arbitration . .

.

will not be enforced, and that refusal to arbitrate is not

available to the parties in an action growing out of the contract.");
Insurance Co. of North America v. Bachler, 44 Neb. 549, 62 N.W. 911
(1895).
11 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
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railroad to recover wages claimed due him as the result of being
laid off when he had seniority rights. One of the defenses 12 advanced by the railroad was that the plaintiff-employee should not
have resorted to court action until he had exhausted the arbitration
plan of adjusting grievances provided for in the working agreement
between the union and the railroad. The Nebraska court, quoting
14
from one of its prior opinions, 1 reiterated the following rule:
Whatever may be the rule elsewhere it is now the firmly established
doctrine here that though the parties to a contract provide that if a
dispute arise between them that such dispute shall be submitted to
arbitration, refusal to arbitrate or no arbitration is not a defense
to an action brought on such a contract by one of the parties
thereto, as the effect of such agreement is to oust the courts of their
legitimate jurisdiction and is contrary to public policy and therefore
void.
It is significant that the court, in reaching the above conclusion
quoted from the Nebraska Bill of Rights: 15
All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy
by due course of law, and justice administered without denial or
delay.
The reliance upon this provision, plus the characterization of the
arbitration agreement as "void" raises two questions. First, is the
arbitration agreement void, or is it merely unenforceable? Second,
is the basis for the nonrecognition of the agreement one of public
policy, or is it founded upon some constitutional mandate? The
answers to these questions are by no means clear.
The earlier cases indicate the agreement, as a matter of state
substantive law, is void rather than merely incapable of enforcement. In Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 16 however,
the court's approach to the problem is somewhat inconsistent
with the conclusions drawn from prior decisions. The court refused
to allow an attempt to enforce a commercial arbitration agreement

The defendant further claimed that a contract between a union and
an employer does not establish a contract between the individual members and the company, and therefore, an action on that contract cannot be sustained by the individual. The court thoroughly discussed the
issue and concluded that the individual could enforce his contractual
rights on a third party beneficiary basis.
13National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N.W. 466 (1895).
14 126 Neb. 493, 505-06, 253 N.W. 694, 700 (1934).
15 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
16 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950).
12
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under the Federal Arbitration Act.1n The agreement was not denominated as void, but procedurally unenforceable."' The syllabus
of the court stated that "the issue is one of procedure and not of
substantive right."' 9 No mention was made of the prior decisions
categorizing such an agreement as void.
Another factor lending itself to the conclusion that the agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only and not void is the Nebraska rule that once there has been a voluntary submission to20
arbitration, an award will be final and binding upon the parties.
This result is reached even though the submission is pursuant to
a prior agreement to arbitrate, 21 and even though the 22procedure
used does not comply with that provided for by statute.
The more critical of the two problems raised by the Nebraska
decisions concerns the grounds used by the court in refusing to
give effect to these agreements. The use of the Nebraska Constitution indicates that the unenforceability is due to a constitutional directive against an agreement which imposes a limitation
on the power of the courts. On the other hand, there is a definite
flavor from the many opinions that the basis is at least not solely
constitutional in nature, but stems from public policy, part of which
has been formulated by our constitution. For example, where a
fire insurance policy contained an agreement to arbitrate damages,
Commissioner Roscoe Pound, concurring in the holding that such an
agreement was unenforceable, stated: "Were the question a new
one, I do not believe this court would take the stand to which it is
now committed. '23 Pound's position does not denote a constitutional
bar against enforcement; to the contrary, it evidences a feeling

1761

Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1958).

18 See note 10 supra where the language used by the court is quoted.

Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d
657 (1950): "Where arbitration constitutes a part of the contract between parties to it and an attempt is made to enforce arbitration by
invoking the Federal Arbitration Act, in the courts of this state the
issue is one of procedure and not of substantive right, and the laws of
this state are controlling." (syllabus of court).
20 Hughes v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N.W. 309 (1914); Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb. 740, 69 N.W. 118 (1896).
21 Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb. 740, 745, 69 N.W. 118,
119 (1896): "An award, whether under the statute or at common law,
is, in the absence of fraud or mistake, binding upon the parties thereto,
and the burden of alleging and proving its invalidity rests upon the
party seeking to impeach it."
22
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2103, 25-2110 (Reissue 1956).
23
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 588, 92 N.W. 736, 737 (1902).
19
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that the basis of these decisions can be found in the public policy
of the state.
The importance of ascertaining the basis for the Nebraska
position becomes apparent when evaluating the effect of Section
301 (a) of the LMRA on Nebraska law. As will be seen, the only
factor which could preclude Section 301 (a) from changing the
position with respect to a labor-management arbitration arrangement would be the lack of jurisdiction in Nebraska courts to enforce
these agreements.2 4 Public policy as a basis is certainly not sufficient to oust the Nebraska courts of their jurisdiction; 25 moreover, it is highly doubtful that Article I, § 13 of the Nebraska Constitution would have this operative result.2 6 Assuming the agreement would impose a limitation on the power of the courts, this
limitation refers only to the fact the parties are precluding themselves from using the courts until after arbitration; the actual
jurisdiction of the court is in no way limited.

B. EFFECT OF SEcTIoN 301 OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
Section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act 27 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
After enactment of this section there was considerable dispute

24

See discussion in subsection C infra.

25

Public policy, of course, affects only the procedural enforceability of a
cause of action, and not jurisdictional limits which are set by statutory

and constitutional provisions. Even assuming that public policy could
operate upon the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court, this state's former
policy has been supplanted by that of federal law, at least insofar as
labor arbitration agreements are concerned. See text at notes 55 and 56
infra.
26
This provision may not be the only constitutional section involved. In
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736 (1902) art. I,
§ 6 of the Nebraska Constitution, guaranteeing the right to trial by
jury, was mentioned in the court's holding that an arbitration agreement was void. However, Pound, C., concurring, stated: "I do not
think the constitutional provision with reference to trial by jury has
any bearing upon the question involved in this case. The same provision
is to be found in the constitution of the United States and in the constitutions of the several states." 66 Neb. at 588-89, 92 N.W. at 737-33.
27 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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whether it was merely jurisdictional or whether it created a federal substantive law to be fashioned by the federal courts. 28 The
doubt was finally resolved in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
29
Mills.

When the employer refused to arbitrate grievances the

union brought an action in federal district court under Section 301
to compel arbitration. Faced head-on" with the question of the
applicable law in suits under Section 301 (a), the Court stated:
"We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under Section 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws." 31 The United States Supreme
Court then went on to hold that Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 32 did not prevent a federal court from ordering arbitration.
It is thus evident that a federal district court will enforce an
agreement to arbitrate. The internal law of the forum state would
have no bearing on the question of whether the arbitration agreement should be enforced.
The next piece which must be fitted into our puzzle is a determination of whether the jurisdiction of the federal court in Section
301 (a) actions is exclusive, or whether a state court might exercise
concurrent jurisdiction. The solution is found in Charles Dowd Box

28

29

30

Those cases which held § 301 (a) to be merely jurisdictional include
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL v. Jay-Ann Co., 228
F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956); United Steelworkers of America, CIO v. Galland-Henning M_.fg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1957); Mercury Oil Ref.
Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, CIO, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
Among the decisions to the effect that § 301 (a) created substantive law
include Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954); United Elec., Radio &
Machine Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Textile
Workers Union, CIO v. Arista Mills, Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951);
Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. International Molders & Foundry
Union, 193 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1951); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950); Schatte v.
International Alliance, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
This question was previously before the Court in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955), but four Justices could not reach a conclusion as to the effect
of § 301(a).

31353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).

Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958). Basically, § 7 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act was that provision which curtailed the injunctive powers
of the federal courts in cases "involving or growing out of a labor
dispute."

3247
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Co. v. Courtney,33 a 1962 Supreme Court decision. It was there
determined that a state court could exercise concurrent jurisdiction, as there is "nothing in the concept of our federal system
[which] prevents state courts from enforcing rights created by
federal law. '34 and because, furthermore, Section
301 (a) itself does
35
not speak in terms of exclusive jurisdiction.
Again, it should be noted that merely because a state court
has concurrent jurisdiction in this area it is not free to apply state
law in interpreting the contract. Lincoln Mills36 and, more recently, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.3 7 dictate that state

courts must apply the federal substantive law when such agreements are before them, or, in the alternative, apply state law to
the extent it is compatible with the federal law.
The state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction not only with
the federal courts, but also with NLRB in Section 301 actions. In
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n 38 an employee commenced a state
court action against the employer asserting a claim for damages
which resulted from an alleged breach of the collective bargaining

368 U.S. 502 (1962).
34368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962).
33The precise language of § 301 (a) appears in the text at note 23 supra.
"The general question, whether State courts can exercise concurrent
33

jurisdiction with the Federal courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, has been elaborately
discussed, both on the bench and in published treatises . . . [and] the
result of these discussions has, in our judgment, been ... to affirm the
jurisdiction, where it is not excluded by express provision, or by
incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular

case." Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
U.S. 448 (1957). "Federal interpretation of the federal law will
govern, not state law. [citations omitted] But state law, if compatible
with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy. [citations omitted] Any
state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will
not be an independent source of private rights." Id. at 457.
37 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
The Court expressly held that "incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law."
Id. at 102. The decision is further significant because of the federal
substantive law it developed. A bargaining agreement reserved the
right of the employer to discharge for cause, and provided that differences in interpretation should be settled by arbitration. An employee
was fired and the union called a strike to compel rehiring. Despite
the absence of a no-strike clause, this was held to be a violation of
the contract, and a state court damage suit was upheld.
38 371 U.S. 195 (1962).

36353
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agreement. The Michigan Supreme Court viewed the actions of
the employer as constituting an unfair labor practice, thus depriving the state court of jurisdiction. 39 The Supreme Court reversed,
rejecting the pre-emption argument, and holding that the state
courts could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Board.40 The
fact that the contract violation was an unfair labor practice would
not act to deprive the state court of its Section 301 jurisdiction.
C. SECTIoN 301 (A)

"SUBSTANTVE LAW" AND THE

RESULTING NEBRASKA

PUZZLE
At this juncture, the Nebraska problem emerges. As we have
seen, Section 301 (a) creates a federal substantive law of contracts
applicable to labor-management collective bargaining agreements,
and there is no question but what a state court has authority to enforce these contract rights. The question, therefore, is whether the
Nebraska courts can deny enforcement of an arbitration agreement
contained in such a contract on the basis of state law.41
In regard to state enforcement of federally created rights, it
is clear that a state may not act in a discriminatory manner by
refusing to enforce the federal right, while, at the same time, enforcing analogous forum-created rights.42 That is, if a state enforces
a forum-created right, an analogous federally-created right must
likewise be enforced. This assumes, of course, concurrent jurisdiction between the two courts. On the other hand, it has never been
decided whether a state court must enforce a federal right where
no analogous state created right exists. It is at least doubtful that
the Supremacy Clause would force such a requirement upon the

39 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1961). The Michigan court relied upon
the Garmon rule that if the particular action is at least arguably an
unfair labor practice, the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. See San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485 (1953).
40 "The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which
also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301,
but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts
in suits under § 301." 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962).
41 This ensuing discussion is limited solely to § 301 contracts, that is, those
arbitration agreements entered into "between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce" as define by the National Labor Relations Act.
42Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947); Hart, The Relations Between State And Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 507 (1954).
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states. 43 Fortunately, this question need not be handled in dealing
with the problem now under discussion. It appears that the only
situation in which such a problem would be faced is that instance
44
where the state court actually lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Preliminary examination should begin with Section 301 itself.
The primary motive behind its passage "was the belief that the
courts of many States could provide only imperfect relief because
of rules of local law which made suits against labor organizations
difficult or impossible, by reason of their status as unincorporated
associations. ' 45 Thus, the problem was not one of state recognition
of a cause of action arising under a labor contract, but rather one of
procedural difficulties attendant upon an attempt to sue a labor
organization as an entity.46 No attempt was being made by Con-

gress to create a cause of action where one did not exist by state
law. The cause of action was already recognized.
The Nebraska rule against enforcement of arbitration agreements cannot stand as a sufficient basis to deny enforcement of

43

Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), the Court, after deciding that
Rhode Island was bound to enforce a penal act of the United States,
concluded: 'It is conceded that this same type of claim arising under

1n

Rhode Island law would be enforced by that State's courts. Its courts
have enforced claims for double damages growing out of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Thus the Rhode Island courts have jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action.
Under these circumstances the State courts are not free to refuse
enforcement of petitioners' claim." Id. at 394. See Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U.S. 130 (1876); THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 514 (Wright's ed. 1961)
(Hamilton).
44
In Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), it was argued that Rhode Island
had no more obligation to enforce a penal law of the United States than
it has to enforce a penal law of a sister state. To this assertion the Court
responded: "It disregards the purpose and effect of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' " Id. at 389.
45
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510 (1962).
46
Interestingly, this was no problem in Nebraska, for NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 25-313 (Reissue 1956) provides: "Any company or association of
persons formed for the purpose of (1) carrying on any trade or business,
(2) holding any species of property in this state or (3) representing
employees in collective bargaining with employers, and not incorporated, may sue and be sued by such usual name as such company,
partnership or association may have assumed to itself or be known by."

COMMENTS
such an agreement which is part of a labor-management contract
falling within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act.
As mentioned, this is not a question of enforcement of a federally
created right which did not exist under state law, nor do the Nebraska courts lack jurisdiction. As a matter of state law, the cause
of action on the contract exists; Section 301 gives rise to the same
cause, but under federal law. What is involved is the question of
the enforceability of a segment of that contract-the arbitration
clause.
The argument against the enforcement of a Section 301 arbitration clause in Nebraska can be predicated on two possible lines
of reasoning, both of which, would probably prove unsuccessful.
The first argument is that the Nebraska courts lack jurisdiction to
enforce arbitration agreements and this cannot be forced upon them
by Congressional enactment. This argument has been refuted
above; the courts do have jurisdiction, and the Supremecy Clause,
imposing upon the judges of the several states the duty of enforcing
the laws of the United States, precludes this line of reasoning. The
second possible argument takes the following form: Enforceability
is a matter of state procedure, and Congress has not seen fit to
substitute federal procedure in this area. This position must also
fail.
The Nebraska court has applied the procedural label to an
arbitration agreement in order to avoid enforceability under one
federal act.47 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in at least one

instance, has characterized commercial arbitration as remedial.4 8
Such a label, however, has not been attached to arbitration in the
labor contract field. In fact, the Court has stated: 49

47 Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657

(1950). The developments since this decision are interesting. In Robert

Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. granted, 362 U. S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960),
it was decided that the Federal Arbitration Act created a body of
federal substantive law, and a part of this substantive law was the
arbitration agreement.
48
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). See 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1382 (1960), which discusses Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), the case referred to in note
45 supra. It is pointed out that Congress was keenly aware of the Red
Cross Line case when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and
relied upon the characterization of arbitration as remedial. 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1382, 1383 (1960).
49
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
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Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions
from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the
hostility evinced by the courts toward arbitration of commercial
agreements has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes
under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the
collective bargaining process itself.
The enforceability of arbitration agreements in the labor-management area is not, therefore, a procedural or remedial question. It
has become an integral part of the collective bargaining process,
and thus a matter of federal substantive law. 50
As the Lincoln Mills decision dictates that federal substantive
law must govern the construction of Section 301 (a) contracts, the
Nebraska courts, on this basis, must recognize the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements contained in such contracts.
The federal substantive law replaces or supplants existing state law
insofar as state law is inconsistent with federal law. Contained
within this federal substantive law is the enforceability of arbitration agreements. The Nebraska rule being contrary, federal law
pre-empts, and the Nebraska courts would be required to recognize
and enforce this segment of the contract.
The characterization of arbitration agreements as a part of the
federal substantive law of Section 301 (a) contracts is not the only
basis for arriving at the above conclusions. This same proposition
can be derived through additional reasoning, though perhaps in
reality founded upon identical concepts.
50 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962) ("The Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 represented a far-reaching and
many-faceted legislative effort to promote the achievement of industrial
peace through encouragement and refinement of the collective bargaining process. It was recognized from the outset that such an effort
would be purposeless unless both parties to a collective bargaining
agreement could have reasonable assurance that the contract they had
negotiated would be honored. Section 301 (a) reflects congressional
recognition of the vital importance of assuring the enforceability of
such agreements."); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) ("But the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of
industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the
unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will
generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The
processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a
vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective
bargaining agreement."). With regard to the function and importance
of arbitration see also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV.
L. Rv. 1482 (1959).
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In cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 5'
the Supreme Court has indicated that a federal right cannot be
defeated by the application of local rules of pleading or practice
contrary to those applied in federal courts.52 Although the Court
has yet to set up any precise standards 53 by which to judge whether
local rules will be allowable in state enforcement of federally
created rights, the problem is basically one of statutory construction. If Congress intended a particular federal rule or procedure
to be applicable, then the Supremacy Clause makes it incumbent
upon the state court to follow this procedure. 4 In the labor contract field there is no uncertainty about the attitude of Congress
toward arbitration agreements-they are definitely favored. Consequently, the predictable result is that the Court will not allow the
substitution of a local practice which frustrates this policy.
There is an additional theory upon which the enforceability of
a Section 301 arbitration agreement in the Nebraska courts could
possibly rest. As Section 301 creates a body of federal substantive
contract law, it could be argued that such a contract, with its arbitration agreement, was entered into by the parties as a federal
contract. That is, though the parties may have negotiated and
signed the contract in Nebraska, the operation of Section 301 and

5135 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
52Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (issue of fraud in
obtaining releases could not be decided by judge, as was done in state
practice, but must, as a matter of federal law, go to the jury); Brown
v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (strict local rule of construing
pleading against the drafter was not allowed; the federal rule of construing the pleading in the light most favorable to the drafter was
applied); Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915) (contrary
to the state rule which placed on the plaintiff the burden of proving
himself free from contributory negligence, the federal rule which
placed the affirmative burden on the defendant was applied).
53 In a diversity of citizenship situation Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), requires that state substantive law be applied. The test now
applied to determine what is substance and what is procedure is the
"significantly affecting the outcome" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945). Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the test as whether
"it significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation for a federal court
to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon
the same claim by the same parties in a State court." 326 U.S. at 109.
In the converse Erie situation, absent any express Congressional design,
this same test could very well be applied. That is, whether the result
is significantly affected if the state court disregards federal law which
would control had the action been originally commenced in federal
court.
54
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See note 41 supra.
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the Lincoln Mills decision caused it to become a federal contract
rather than a Nebraska contract. The question of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in such a case would possibly 55
be governed by rules usually applicable to an interstate conflict
of laws situation.56
Nebraska has adopted the following rule in respect to contracts
57
made in another jurisdiction and sought to be enforced here:
[Tihe validity of a contract, the obligations thereof, and the
capacity of the parties thereto are to be determined by the
lex loci contractus unless there is something in the contract which
is prohibited by express statute or infringes upon some positive
rule of public policy.

There exists, of course, the argument that Nebraska has adopted
a "positive rule of public policy" against the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Under the above rationale, so the argument
proceeds, enforcement would still be denied. The weight of such
a position is doubtful, however, in view of the developments since
the early Nebraska decisions. The arbitration agreement under
consideration is not the commercial arbitration agreement which
historically has been contrary to public policy; instead we are dealing with a labor-management agreement. The United States Supreme Court has stated that not only does such an agreement become part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself, but
55 One difficulty with this argument is that it presupposes a determination
that the question of enforceability is substantive in nature. Historically,
foreign agreements to arbitrate have been held unenforceable, the
question being one of procedure and thus governed by the law of the
forum. There have been, however, forceful arguments to the contrary.

See generally,

STUMBERG,

CONFLICT OF LAWS

269-76 (3d ed. 1963);

Heilman, ArbitrationAgreements and the Conflict of Laws, 38 YALE L.J.
617 (1929); Stern, The Conflict of Laws in Commercial Arbitration, 17
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 567 (1952).
56 See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 304-09 (3d ed. 1949). "IT]he enforcement of the claim based upon foreign facts is said to be conditioned
upon the nonviolation of the public policy of the forum; sometimes
expressed by saying that neither the court of the forum nor its citizens
must be inconvenienced by giving the contract effect, nor must the
consideration of the agreement be immoral ....
Again the statement is
frequently more elaborately stated to exclude the enforcement of
admittedly valid contracts: (a) Where the contract in question is
contrary to good morals; (b) where the state of the forum or its
citizens would be injured through the enforcement by its courts of the
kind in question; (c) where the contract violates the positive legislation
of the forum, that is, contrary to its Constitution or statutes; and
(d) where the contract violates the public policy of the state of the
forum." Id. at 304-05.
57Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 39, 277 N.W. 785, 789 (1938).
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it is to be distinguished from the commercial agreement. 58 Congress has fashined a public policy in the form of the National
Labor Relations Act, and this policy is as much a part of the Nebraska public policy as any forum created rule.59 It is a nationwide public policy, and one favoring arbitration.
Any public policy argument against the enforceability of
arbitration agreements is far less persuasive when these agreements
form a part of a collective bargaining contract. The Nebraska public
policy has been supplanted, or at least substantially modified, by
Congressional enactment.
D. A COLLATERAL ISSUE -THE No-STRE= CLAUSE
Discussion of state enforced Section 301 (a) rights is incomplete
without some reference to the problem ° created by the inclusion
of a no-strike clause in the contract. When Section 301 was enacted there arose a divergence of opinion as to whether a court, be
it state01 or federal, 62 could issue an injunction as a means of en58 United

Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).

59 See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) ("The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of
the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline
jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal
contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the
power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for
all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for
all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly
in the courts of the State.").
CoAttention will only be focused on the no-strike clause itself, and the
problems raised by attempts toward enforcing this contractual provision. Closely related, however, are the problems concerning the relationship between an arbitration clause and a no-strike clause in the
same agreement. The Supreme Court has held that a breach of the
clause by a union will not relieve the employer of his duty to arbitrate.
In such a situation the arbitration agreement itself has not been repudiated; the two clauses are not so interdependent as to excuse the
employer's obligation where the union breaches its promise; and there
is no waiver or estoppel. United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham
Packing Co., 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4202 (U.S. March 9, 1964); Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
61 See McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49
Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957) discussed following note 62 infra.
62 Compare Chauffeurs Union Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines,
Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960) with Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See Note,
40 NEB. L. REV. 534 (1961) where the position was taken that the nostrike clause should be accorded specific enforcement.
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forcing a no-strike clause contained in a collective bargaining contract. One segment of the conflict concerned the issue of whether
Section 301 impliedly repealed Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
In Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson 65 the no-strike question was
resolved with respect to federal courts. It was determined that a
federal court had no injunctive authority to enforce such a clause.
The Court would not construe Section 301 (a) so as to create an
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia injunction prohibitions. It was
felt that had Congress intended to repeal these prohibitions, it
would have done so expressly, especially since Congressional history demonstrated that consideration had been64given to the NorrisLaGuardia Act when Section 301 was enacted.
Although the Court has yet to decide whether Norris-LaGuardia is a part of the federal substantive law of Section 301 contracts, thus prohibiting state enforcement of a no-strike clause;
the California court in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist.
Council of Carpenters65 held that such a clause could be enforced
by a state court. The decision of the California court appears
predicated upon the dual concept that Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia was applicable only to federal courts, and that Congress
had not chosen to exclude expressly the state equitable remedies in
actions based upon Section 301 contracts. 60
The better view, however, would seem to be that adopted by
the cogent dissent of Justice Carter. It was his feeling that the

63

370 U.S. 195 (1962).

See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 204-09 (1962).
65 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
66 "[Tlhe better view would seem to be that the inclusion of specific
instances in the Labor Management Relations Act in which injunctive
relief is expressly authorized negatives any general repeal of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in respect to the enforcement of collective bar04

gaining agreements....

By its holding in Textile Workers v. Lincoln

Mills of Alabama. . . [353 U.S. 448 (1957)], that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was never intended to prohibit specific enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate, the Supreme Court has not suggested otherwise; strike
injunctions clearly were intended to fall under the ban of the act.
"If it is assumed that federal courts cannot enjoin strikes in actions
under § 301 save in compliance with the strict requirements of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, state courts enforcing federal rights are not
necessarily subject to the same restraint. In the first place it is not
entirely clear that Congress can compel a state court to withhold a
remedy that would be available if the action arose under the contract
law of the state." 49 Cal. 2d at 61, 315 P.2d at 330-31 (1957).
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federal law, including the available remedies, is to be applied to
a state court action under Section 301. The reasons set forth are
essentially those hereinbefore given as a basis for the view that
the Nebraska prohibition against enforcement of arbitration agreements will not operate as an inhibitory device for state court action.
That is, the remedies are a part of the federal substantive law
referred to in Lincoln Mills; and a state may not prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal statutes protect.6 7
The McCarroll result is not only violative of the policy decisions behind labor legislation,68 but it would certainly place an
exhorbitant premium on legal tactics and the artful drafting of
pleadings. For example, assuming the existence of an independent
state cause of action, a state which allowed a labor injunction as
an available remedy in Section 301 suits, would provide the moving
party with the dominant hand in determining the extent of judicial
power. Furthermore, assuming an employer first commenced the
action in state court with the thought in mind of obtaining injunctive relief, the possibilities of removal by the defendant would
further complicate the situation. Although the question of removal
has not itself been decided by the Court,69 an accepted rule in removal of cases arising under federal law 70 is that the pleadings
must show on their face that the cause of action is federal in
nature.71 If an independent state cause exists and this basic rule
prevails in Section 301 contract actions, a premium would be placed
on the artfully drawn pleading. Such will not be the result; it is
altogether clear that this independent cause of action is non-

The following statement from Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) is significant: "Any state law applied, however,
will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source
of private rights." This would seem to preclude any argument that
the injunction remedy can be used on account of the existence of an
independent state cause of action.
08 See note 48 supra.
69 See Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511
(D. Colo. 1959); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
7062 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958) provides: "Except as
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending."
71 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
67
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existent when the requirements of Section 301 jurisdiction are
met.

72

E. SoME

CONCLUSIONS

Granted that the availability of Nebraska courts as a forum
for Section 301 contract violations involving arbitration agreements
is not a necessary prerequisite for either party to enforce fully his
available remedies, recent Nebraska litigation indicates that its
importance cannot be minimized.73 Certainly, the practicioner who
is physically far removed from the sites of the federal district
courts in Nebraska would find it advantageous to be able to use
state district courts as forum for redress. Furthermore, even in
those situations where the physical availability of the court is not a
consideration, the use of state courts may be desirable. Crowded
dockets, familiarity with local procedure or mere personal preference of state over federal court are perfectly valid reasons for
giving the parties their choice of forums.
72

There must be a contract between an "employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce" as
defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
73 These issues appear to have been raised for the first time, although
in a peripheral manner, in litigation between Omaha Taxi Cab Companies and the Taxicab Drivers Union Local 762 in March 1964. Safeway
Cabs, Inc. v. Taxi Cab Drivers Union Local 762, Nebraska Court of
Industrial Relations, No. 18. The parties entered into an agreement
stating that it "shall be in full force and effect from July 1, 1961 to and
including June 30, 1963 and shall continue in full force and effect from
year to year thereafter unless either party serves upon the other party
60 days notice prior to the expiration date of this Agreement of their
desire to negotiate changes, modifications, or terminate this Agreement."
In April, 1963, the union notified the cab companies that it was "desirous
of continuing this Agreement, but desirous to negotiate changes in said
Agreement, and as soon as our proposed changes in said Agreement
are prepared, we will forward a copy to you for your consideration."
The agreement also contained a grievance procedure providing "any
controversy which may hereafter arise over the interpretation of or
adherence to the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be settled
by negotiations between the parties. In case no agreement can be
reached after forty-eight (48) hours, the disagreement shall be submitted to an arbitrator to be selected by the company and the union....
The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the
company and the union." After bargaining to the point of impasse
concerning the proposed changes, the union proposed to strike in
February, 1964. The Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations granted
a temporary restraining order on the petition of one of the cab companies
affected. Later, the union's motion to dismiss was granted for the reason
that, on the basis of federal substantive labor contract law, the no-strike
provision had no application to a strike after impasse in the negotiations
concerning changes. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957);
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PART H
SCHERMERHORN AND THE NEBRASKA
RIGHT TO WORK LAW
The avowed purpose of this article was to piece together two
jigsaw puzzles caused, in part, by Supreme Court characterization
of "substantive law" in the labor contract area. Consideration now
turns to the second puzzle. The framework pieces consist of the
Nebraska "right-to-work" legislation,74 Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act75 and two recent Supreme Court opinions
in Retail Clerks, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn 6
A. THE NEBRASKA "RIGHT-To-WoRi" LAW
The significance of Section 14(b) and the Schermerhorn decisions is particularly important because of Nebraska internal law.
Nebraska is one of a number of states having what is commonly
77
referred to as a "right-to-work" law. The statute provides:
[N]o person shall be denied employment because of membership

in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor
organization or because of refusal to join, affiliate with, or pay a

fee either directly or indirectly to a labor organization; nor shall

any individual or corporation or association of any kind enter into
any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor
organization.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). The court did
not pass on the question whether the law preventing a federal district
court from issuing an injunction to enforce specifically a no-strike
clause also deprives the Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations of
jurisdiction in the same situation. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195 (1962).
In a separate suit filed in the District Court in Douglas County,
the District Judge, without the statutory mandate against strikes contained in the Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations Act, refused to
award a temporary restraining order in the same situation. The matter
was set for a hearing and, in addition to the other issues of federal
substantive law and pre-emption, the lack of jurisdiction of a Nebraska
court to enforce specifically a no-strike clause because of the limitations
on a federal district court in the same situation, and the unavailability
of a judicial remedy ending arbitration were extensively argued.
74NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (Supp. 1961); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-218-19
(Reissue 1960). The statute is based on NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, §§ 13-15.
7561 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
76 373 U.S. 746 (1963) (for purposes of the following discussion this
decision will be referred to as Schermerhorn I); 84 Sup. Ct. 219 (1963)
(this decision will be referred to as Schermerhorn II).
77 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 48-217 (Supp. 1961) (Emphasis added).
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Although there has been noticeable absence of judicial construction given this section,7 8 its impact on the agency shop agreement,
is relatively clear. Prior to the addition of the amendatory provisions italicized above, an Attorney General's opinion held the
agency shop device to fall within the coverage of the statute.70
Reliance was placed on the term "affiliation with." With the addition of the phrase "or pay a fee either directly or indirectly to,"
there is no doubt that the Nebraska law prohibits the agency shop
agreement.8 0
B.

1625 v. SCHERMERHORN
Schermerhorn I involved the status of an agency shop union
security arrangement s' entered into between the union and an
employer in the state of Florida. An action, based upon the Florida
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCAL

v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (The Supreme
Court decided that the Nebraska statute was inapplicable to labor
organizations covered by the Railway Labor Act.); Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d 477
(1948), aff'd, 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (the validity of the legislation was
affirmed). For a discussion of the Nebraska law and "right-to-work"
legislation generally, see Swindler, The Right to Work, A Decade of
DeveZopment, 36 NEB. L. REV. 276 (1957).
79 Ops. NEB. ATT'Y GEN. 295 (1960).
80With regard to enforceability, the Attorney General stated: "[I]t is
our opinion that the effect of the law is to make it not a misdemeanor
for an individual or corporation or association of any kind to enter into
what has been herein defined as an 'agency shop' agreement. The
object of the contract clause being for an illegal purpose, the clause
itself is illegal and unenforceable." Id. at 298.
81 The contract provided: "Employees shall have the right to voluntarily
join or refrain from joining the Union. Employees who choose not to
join the Union, however, and who are covered by the terms of this
contract, shall be required to pay as a condition of employment, an
initial service fee and monthly service fees to the Union for the
purpose of aiding the Union in defraying costs in connection with its
legal obligations and responsibilities as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. The aforesaid fees
shall be payable on or before the first day of each month, and such
sums shall in no case exceed the initiation fees and the membership
dues paid by those who voluntarily choose to join the Union. Other
than the payment of these service fees, those employees who do not
choose to join the Union shall be under no further financial obligations
or requirements of any kind to the Union. It shall also be a condition of
employment that all employees covered by this Agreement shall on
the 30th day following the beginning of such employment or the effective
date of this agreement, whichever is later, pay established initial and
monthly service fees as shown above." 373 U.S. 746, 748-49 (1963).
78 Railway Employee's Dept.
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"right-to-work" law,8 2 was instituted in state court by four nonunion employees to have the agreement declared void. The Florida
Supreme Court held that the "right-to-work" legislation covered
an agency shop arrangement.8

3

On certiorari, the Supreme Court

decided that this type of union security agreement came within

the purview of Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
and its legality was thus subjected to the demands of state substantive law.
Section 14(b) provides that "the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment" shall not be authorized if prohibited by
state law.84 The union's contention was that the NLRB should be
the determinant as to whether a particular union security arrangement fell within the language of Section 14(b). The Court, however, adopted the position that state law governed the interpretation and scope of local "right-to-work" statutes. The agency shop
arrangement involved was said to be the "practical equivalent" of
an "agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment," thus falling within the ambit of Section
14 (b).
The question of whether the Florida courts, rather than the
NLRB, had jurisdiction to afford the remedy was set aside for
reargument. This became the sole issue in Schermerhorn II, and
was resolved by construing Section 14 (b) as a Congressional recognition of the authority of the states to prohibit agency shop arrangements; and further, by finding nothing in the concept of
pre-emption to forbid the state courts from exercising jurisdiction to enforce their statutes.85 As a consequence, in "right-to82

FLA. CoNsT.

83

141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 909 (1962).
14(b) in its entirety reads as follows: 'Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application
of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such

§ 12. ("The right of persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor
union, or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be
construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through
a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their
employer.").

84Section

execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
85 "Garmon, however, does not state a constitutional principle; it merely
rationalizes the problems of coexistence between federal and state
regulatory schemes in the field of labor relations; and it did not present
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work" states, such as Nebraska, enforcement of these statutes at
the expense of union security agreements may now be obtained in
the state courts.
I & II
A proper understanding of the Schermerhorn decisions and
Section 14 (b) must, by necessity, begin with that section of the
National Labor Relations Act which was the impetus of Section
14 (b) -Section 8 (a) (3).86 This provision, which was formerly Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act, abolished the use of the closed shop
as a union security device. It does, however, allow an employer
to make "an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or after the
thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later."
Section 14 (b) was enacted to allow the states to retain the effectiveness of their anti-union security legislation.87 In other words,
this stop-gap legislation was designed to keep Section 8 (a) (3) from
C.

SCOPE AND EFFECT OF SCHERMERHORN

the problems posed by § 14(b), viz., whether the Congress had precluded
state enforcement of select state laws adopted pursuant to its authority.

The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. Congress under
the Commerce Clause may displace state power [Rice v. Santa Fe

Elev. Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234-36; San Diego Council v. Garmon, supra]
or it may even by silence indicate a purpose to let state regulation be
imposed on the federal regime." 84 Sup. Ct. 219, 222-23 (1963).
86 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1958).
87 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947): "Under the House
bill there was included a new Section 13 of the National Labor Relations
Act to assure that nothing in the act was to be construed as authorizing
any closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership, or other
form of compulsory unionism agreement in any State where the
execution of such agreement would be contrary to State law. Many
States have enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions to make
all form of compulsory unionism in those States illegal. It was never
the intention of the National Labor Relations Act . . . to preempt the
field in this regard so as to deprive the States of their powers to
prevent compulsory unionism. Neither the so-called 'closed shop'
proviso in section 8(3) of the existing act nor the union shop and
maintenance of membership proviso in section 8 (a) (3) of the conference
agreement could be said to authorize arrangements of this sort in
States where such arrangements were contrary to the State policy. To
make certain that there should be no question about this, section 13
was included in the House bill. The conference agreement, in section
14(b), contains a provision having the same effect."
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completely stultifying state policy legislation in this area, which,

as a matter of history, was on the upswing.88

A final stepping stone must be crossed before further consideration of the Schermerhorn decisions. NLRB v. General
Motors,8 9 decided at the same time as Schermerhorn I, dealt with
the scope of the term union "membership" as used in the proviso
to Section 8(a) (3). In General Motors the employer refused to
bargain over the union's proposal for the adoption of an agency
shop agreement. The immediate question involved was whether
this refusal was an unfair labor practice; however, the case turned
on whether an agency shop agreement itself was an unfair labor
practice or whether it was an authorized union security device
within the Section 8 (a) (3) proviso. The agency shop proposal was
held to be the "practical equivalent" of union "membership" 90 as
that term is used in Section 8 (a) (3), and thus a permissible arrangement over which the employer was required to bargain. It
was not decided in General Motors what effect a state "right-towork" law would have on the result; this question was reserved
for Schermerhorn I.
It is to be recalled that the Schermerhorn case decided, first,
that the validity of an agency shop agreement must pass the test of
state substantive law; and, second, that the state courts have the jurisdiction and power to enforce their "right-to-work" statutes at the
expense of these agreements. These decisions raised various questions, some of which were answered, while others have been left
for future development. Among those questions falling within the
"answered" category is that concerning the applicable law governing the interpretation and scope of state legislation. It is clear from
Schermerhorn I that the states are free to interpret the scope of
their own statutes, and federal courts or administrative bodies will
be governed by a state determination that a particular union
security arrangement falls within the prohibitory language of a
"right-to-work" type law. This means that the states may not only
apply these statutes to agency shop arrangements, but are free to
apply them to other types of security devices if the statute should

88

See Swindler, The Right to Work, A Decade of Development, 36

N.B.

L. REV. 276 (1957).
89 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
90

"We are therefore confident that the proposal made by the union here
conditioned employment upon the practical equivalent of union 'membership' as Congress used that term in the proviso to § 8(a) (3)." Id.
at 743.
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be so broad. State law governs the initial decision of whether the
contractual obligation violates state legislation.
It must be emphasized, however, that this does not give the
states a completely free rein in governing the legality of union
security agreements. Such agreements are allowed as a matter of
federal law when the requirements of Section 8 (a) (3) have been
met. Section 14 (b) is the exception, and only in those situations
where state law prohibits "agreements requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment" does the union
security clause lose its validity.
The agency shop arrangement in Schermerhorn I was not
voided solely because Florida law prohibited it. It was held that
as a matter of federal law the agency shop was the "practical
equivalent" of union "membership"' as that term was used in
Section 14(b). The General Motors decision, which applied the
practical equivalent test to an agency shop viewed in the light of
Section 8(a) (3), was the backbone of this result. The Court
pointed to the relationship between Section 14(b) and Section
8 (a) (3), and concluded that the term union "membership" meant
the same thing in both provisions. Consequently, the "practical
equivalent" test was applicable to both sections.
An agency shop agreement falls within Section 14(b), not
because of state law nor as a result of an express Congressional
enactment, but because of the judicial construction of the word
"membership" by the United States Supreme Court. The result
is a relatively clear and distinct division of governing law in the
union security contract area. Before state law invalidates a union
security provision, two hurdles must be cleared. The contractual
provision must first fall within the prohibitory language of the
statute or constitutional provision. The second hurdle which must
9
the prohibited
be cleared is one governed by federal lawg-whether

91 "At the very least, the agreements requiring 'membership' in a labor
union which are expressly permitted by the proviso are the same
'membership' agreements expressly placed within the reach of state
law by § 14(b). It follows that the General Motors case rules this
one, for we there held that the 'agency shop' arrangement involved
here-which imposes on employees the only membership obligation
enforceable under § 8(a) (3) by discharge, namely, the obligation to
pay initiation fees and regular dues-is the 'practical equivalent' of an
'agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment.'" Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n. v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S.
746, 751 (1963).
92 These "hurdles," of course, need not be "cleared" in this order. For
example, in Amalgamated Ass'n. of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
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clause in the contract is the type contemplated by Section 14 (b).
Federal law determines whether the particular agreement is one
"requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment."
Beyond the union shop and agency shop agreements, exactly
how far state authority can extend in the union security field under
the guise of Section 14 (b) legislation is an open question. In view
of the scope of this article there will be no attempt to answer this
question categorically with respect to the various union security
devices.9 3 In each situation, assuming the hurdle of state law has
been passed, consideration must be given to the actual wording of
the agreement and its practical operative effect. If the effect is
to require the "practical equivalent" of union "membership," there
is no reason to believe the Supreme Court will deviate from this
subjective test which was established in NLRB v. General Motors,
and reaffirmed in Schermerhorn I. The problem, of course, is the
same as in any subjective analysis-the uncertainty of a situationby-situation approach.
D. EXTENT OF STATE PoWER
A final area to be herein considered is the extent of state power
in the Section 14 (b) situation, a question raised by a concluding
paragraph to the Schermerhorn II decision: 94
As a result of § 14(b), there will arise a wide variety of situations
presenting problems of the accommodation of state and federal
jurisdiction in the union-security field. As noted, Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, [336 U. S. 301] upheld
the right of a State to reinstate with back pay an employee discharged in violation of a state union security law. On the other
hand, picketing in order to get an employer to execute an agreement to hire all-union labor in vi6lation of a state union security
statute lies exclusively in the federal domain (Local Union 429 etc.
v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U. S. 969 ...and Local No. 438
v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 . . ), because state power, recognized by
ployees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc., 319 F.2d 783
(9th Cir. 1963) the court first answered the federal question and then
proceeded to inquire into the state law issues.
93
Perhaps the most obvious union security device over which state 14(b)
control is uncertain is the hiring hall arrangement. Such a device has
been upheld as a matter of federal labor law under the NLRA. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). The
question of State authority to prohibit such arrangements has not been
discussed, but it is conceivable that a clause of this nature could be
considered as the "practical equivalent" of an agreement requiring
union "membership."
94
Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n. v. Schermerhorn, 84 Sup. Ct. 219, 233 (1963).
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§ 14(b), begins only with actual negotiation and execution of
the type of agreement described by § 14(b). Absent such an agreement, conduct arguably an unfair labor practice would be a matter
for the National Labor Relations Board under Garmon.
The logical interpretation of the Court's observation that state
power will begin "only with actual negotiation and execution"
of the contract is the recognition of this power only after the
agreement has been both negotiated and executed. Section 14 (b)
does not in itself limit state power to the situation where the union
security clause is in formal contract form; however, the decisions
of the Court involving this provision dictate such a requirement.
The analysis again requires reference to the decision in NLRB
v. General Motors and the two Schermerhorn cases. In the General
Motors case it was held that the employer's refusal to bargain over
a union proposal for the adoption of an agency shop agreement was
not an unfair labor practice, as the state in which the contract was
to govern employment arrangements did not prohibit agency shop
agreements.9 5 Reserved for Schermerhorn I was the question of
"whether a different result obtains in States which have declared
such arrangements unlawful."9 6 It was there decided that state
laws prohibiting union and agency shops make such arrangements
unfair labor practices. Section 14(b) removes the protection afforded these agreements by Section 8 (a) (3).97
A determination of the existence of state power can, perhaps,
be best approached by placing the General Motors problem in a
state having "right-to-work" legislation. The result, from the stand-

95 The agreement covered the Indiana plants of the employer. In Meade
Electric Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959) it
was held that the state's "right-to-work" law did not cover the agency
shop agreement, and thus such a device was not prohibited.
96 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 745 (1963).
97Although the Court did not expressly state this principle, this is the
obvious inference drawn from the language of the opinion, plus the
reservation of the question of state power which was carried over to
Schermerhorn II. In Schermerhorn I it was announced: "It is one
thing if § 14(b) and a state law prohibiting the union or the agency
shop have no impact on §§ 7 and 8 at all, and the union and agency
shops are therefore not unfair practices under federal law even in those
States which prohibit them. It is quite another matter, however, if
§ 14(b) removes the protection of the § 8(a) (3) proviso and the union
and agency shops become unfair labor practices in States where state
law forbids them, for then the obvious question is precipitated as to
whether a State as well as the Board may enjoin such union-security
arrangements." Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n. v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S.
746, 756-57 (1963).
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point of the employer, would be changed, for the refusal to bargain
over a proposal to commit an unfair labor practice would not itself
be an unfair labor practice, and thus could not be ordered 8 On
the other hand, the union's proposal of an agency shop agreement
would be a Section 8 (b) (2) violation as an "attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3)."9
These are the implicit results from General Motors and the
Schermerhorn decisions. In General Motors, attention was called
to the fact that the controlling state law did not forbid the agency
shop, and furthermore, the Court recognized a different result might
obtain in a state outlawing such practices. Then, in SchermerhornI
the Court spoke in terms of Section 14 (b) removing the protection
of Section 8 (a) (3), thus resulting in the agency shop becoming an
unfair labor practice in a state prohibiting such an arrangement.
This concept was certainly reaffirmed in Schermerhorn II in the
sidestepping process used to get around the doctrine of San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon.100 The Court refused to adopt the
position that the agreement was not an unfair labor practice, but
pointed out that Garmon "does not state a constitutional principle;
it merely rationalizes the problems of coexistence between federal
and state regulatory schemes in the field of labor relations."''1 1
This would appear to be a recognition that in states such as Nebraska the agency shop agreement itself constitutes the commission
of an unfair labor practice.
With this in mind, attention should now be given to what is
probably the key sentence in the paragraph quoted above. "Absent
such an agreement, conduct arguably an unfair labor practice would
be a matter for the National Labor Relations Board under Garmon."'1 °2 This could only be additional reference to the fact that
in states outlawing agency shop agreements, such an arrangement
constitutes an unfair labor practice, and in the absence of an ac-

98NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);
NLRB v. Int. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1959); NLRB
v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949).
99 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2)
(1958).
100 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For other cases dealing with Garmon pre-emption
question see note 8 supra.
101 Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n. v. Schermerhorn, 84 Sup. Ct. 219, 222 (1963).
102 Id. at 223.
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tual contract the NLRB has sole jurisdiction. If, and only if, such
a contract is entered into, Section 14(b) and Schermerhorn II give
the states, concurrently with the Board, the remedial powers.
E. CONCLUSION
Some final observations are now appropriate. In those states
having no "right-to-work" legislation, the General Motors decision
governs any refusal to bargain over an agency shop arrangement,
and such a refusal constitutes an unfair labor practice. In states
like Nebraska, having such laws, a refusal to bargain over an agency
shop proposal would not constitute an unfair labor practice because of the operation of Section 14(b) on Section 8 (a) (3). In
Nebraska, however, any insistence upon bargaining over such a
provision would itself be a violation of Section 8 (b) (2) and an
unfair labor practice. In such a situation, the NLRB would have
exclusive jurisdiction. State authority to act will only begin when
the contract itself has in fact been executed. Until this time the
Garmon pre-emption doctrine is determinative.
Fredric H. Kauffman '64

